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1. Introduction 
Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) are transactions in which a financial investor takes over a 
company via a special purpose vehicle. The funding of the special purpose vehicle is typically 
composed of several layers of debt and non-traded equity claims. In most of the cases the 
debt/equity ratios of LBO transactions are above what is considered normal. These two 
properties - the illiquidity of the private equity market and the leverage ratio make LBOs high-risk 
investments. No adequate methods have been developed so far to successfully determine the 
risks implied by particular transactions; consequently, risk-adjusted performance ratios that 
benchmark individual transactions are non-existent. In this paper we use contingent claims 
analysis (CCA) to provide a measure of inherent risks in LBO transactions. Typical LBO deal 
structures mean, however, that standard CCA models cannot be used, and so adjustments need 
to be made. 
Green (1984), Sick (1989), and Arzac (1996) point out that when debt/equity ratios in LBO 
transactions are high, the similarity of the equity valuation to a call option valuation becomes 
obvious. Shareholders can exercise the option, take over the company and redeem the debt if 
the enterprise value is above the liabilities. Default is triggered if the company value reaches the 
level of liabilities. Leaving aside agency costs, debt financing thus induces more speculative 
behavior of the shareholders, according to Myers (1977), because they have unlimited earnings 
potential but only limited risk. This makes a CCA-approach a promising method for estimating 
the implied volatilities of transactions in which shareholders and lenders bear a certain amount 
of idiosyncratic risk. 
Underlying the CCA approach is the assumption, that the arrangers of a transaction will 
model future company development and potential scenarios. In accordance with their models, 
they agree a purchase price with the seller and structure the transaction with several equity and 
debt layers. At this moment, prices for the different equity and debt strips are fixed. The LBO   2
sponsors have a finite investment horizon and plan to sell their stakes after a certain holding 
period. The holding period, which is reflected in their transaction model, determines a sponsor’s 
expected internal rate of return on the investment. The transaction model is based on free cash 
flow estimates and considers due redemption of the debt and adherence to the debt covenants. 
Lenders usually ask for an immediate reduction of their exposure in large scales after the closing 
of a LBO transaction. Hence, an appropriate leverage ratio must be applied that secures the 
desired return on equity and that fulfills the lender requirements regarding redemption and 
covenants. In a simplified model, where there is just a single layer of common equity and a 
single layer of risky debt with one amortization payment, the CCA approach determines both, the 
transaction’s and the equity’s idiosyncratic risks. These risks depend on the deployed capital 
structure at closing, the planned investment horizon, the assumed debt redemption capabilities 
of the target company, the risk-free interest rate, and the debt-credit spread. In other words, for a 
given transaction, the arrangers assume a certain volatility in the target company’s asset and 
equity values when they agree on debt and equity prices, bearing in mind the amortization 
schedule over the investment horizon – which is the moment of closing the transaction. 
To a manually collected sample of 40 LBO transactions we apply the Ho and Singer 
(1984) model in order to price risky corporate debt (with one amortization payment). We 
implement a numerical approach to calculating the implied asset value volatilities, which range 
from 13.6% to 106.4% p.a. (mean 35.3% and median 30.4% p.a.). From the asset value 
volatilities we derive the idiosyncratic equity risks for the same transactions, obtaining high 
values ranging from 57.8% to 182.5% p.a. (mean 94.1% and median 93.5% p.a.). This is the 
first time that idiosyncratic risks are calculated for individual LBO transactions. Using data on the 
returns received by the LBO sponsors, we can – also for the first time - calculate Sharpe ratios 
for the individual LBO transactions. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to present a mean idiosyncratic risk or a mean risk-
adjusted performance for the asset class, but to propose an approach to calculate risk-adjusted   3
returns, bearing in mind different degrees of leverage in the transactions. We show that the 
model can be applied to the benchmarking of current and future transactions, which will lead to 
an improved understanding of, and transparency in, the asset class. Comprehensive analyses of 
the mean risk-adjusted performance of the asset class will be possible with the presented 
approach if more data on individual transactions becomes available for academic research. 
2. Literature  Overview 
2.1.  Literature on Financial Risk Measures for the Venture 
Capital and Leveraged Buyout Market Segment 
Several papers deal with associated risks in non-quoted equity markets, but do not usually 
differentiate between different market segments, such as venture capital (VC) and LBOs, and do 
not pay sufficient attention to their particularities, especially when referring to LBO transactions. 
For instance, Cochrane (2005) reports a mean volatility of 86% p.a. for a sample of 16,638 
private equity transactions – calculated via maximum likelihood estimates and sample bias 
correction for unobservable returns but does not differentiate between VC and LBOs; more 
importantly, he does not take account of the degrees of leverage deployed in the LBOs. Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) analyze the performance of private equity investments and create a sub 
sample of LBOs. They do not consider idiosyncratic risk, but systematic risk - which they 
assume to be both equal for every transaction, and equal to the systematic risk of the S&P 500 
Index. Their approach also implies, therefore, that leverage in public and private markets is 
identical on average. Quigley and Woodward (2003) create a VC index similar to that of Peng 
(2001), and report a mean annual standard deviation of returns of 14.6%, while Peng (2001) 
reports annual standard deviations of returns between 9.5% and 70.3% for the period from 1987 
to 1999. Both papers focus on correcting missing values and selection bias and fail to either 
create a LBO sub-sample or to consider individual LBO capital structures in their approach.   4
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) distinguish between VC and LBO market segments and 
analyze LBO performance while controlling for systematic risk. However, because they do not 
have access to exact data for individual deals, they assume industry averages for the 
debt/equity ratios in their calculations of LBO beta factors. These authors report an average beta 
factor of 1.08 for their LBO sample. Groh and Gottschalg (2008) investigate LBO performance 
and focus on systematic risk for transactions using detailed information on debt/equity ratios. For 
several scenarios based on differentiated assumptions about the risk of debt and of debt tax 
shields, they calculate average equity beta factors (for each scenario) ranging from 0.78 to 2.57 
at transaction closing. However, it is not clear which of their scenarios is the “right” one. 
Furthermore, their focus on systematic risk does not enable to calculate rewards for variability. 
This paper differs from the existing literature regarding three important aspects. First of all, 
we focus on idiosyncratic risk and exclusively on LBO transactions. Further, our proposed model 
is derived from CCA, adapted for the characteristics of LBOs and transferred to the asset class. 
This represents a unique and promising approach to the calculation of implied transaction risks 
that account for the risk superimposed by the debt deployed to financing the transaction. This 
approach will enable comprehensive risk-adjusted performance analyses to be performed when 
more data become available. 
The next section describes the origin of our CCA model and related literature. 
2.2.  The Origin of our CCA Model 
Black and Scholes (1972) and Merton (1973 and 1974) devise models to calculate the 
equity value of a company, given the value - and fluctuations in value – of its assets, and 
including the notion of a pure discount bond, time to maturity of the bond, and the risk-free 
interest rate. Assuming that all the other parameters are given, the models can be solved 
numerically for the asset value fluctuation. This asset value fluctuation is called implied volatility, 
and represents a measure of the expected fluctuation in company value. It can be assumed that   5
originators of a LBO transaction set a price for the equity accounting for that risk and the applied 
leverage. All the other parameters are usually known on closing a LBO transaction and the 
Black and Scholes approach could be directly extended to calculating the implied volatility of a 
LBO if this was financed with default-free zero bonds. 
However, since LBO transactions are typically characterized by a large proportion of debt 
at closing and substantial subsequent debt redemptions, default risks and decreasing debt 
levels over time have to be taken into account in the CCA valuation model. Furthermore, some 
deployed debt instruments might allow flexible amortization payments. This complicates the 
adequate CCA model because the exercise price of the option is uncertain, as discussed in 
Fisher (1978). Moreover, standard boundary conditions are no longer valid and interest due 
dates convert the approach into a compound option problem. Black and Cox (1976), and Ho and 
Singer (1982) expand the Merton (1974) pricing model and introduce several bond indenture 
provisions, such as safety covenants, subordination arrangements, and restrictions on the 
financing of interest and dividend payments. 
Geske (1977 and 1979), and Brockman and Turtle (2003) deal with the path-dependent 
option problem. Unfortunately, the models cited are not suitable for our purposes, both because 
they include many parameters that are not observable in our sample data and because they 
require assumptions which cannot be taken as given in LBO transactions. The Geske (1977) 
approach, for example, requires equal sinking fund payments for each coupon date in order to 
completely retire the face value of the debt by maturity. In LBO transactions debt is not usually 
fully redeemed within the financial investor’s planned holding period. 
Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1983 and 1984) formulate a partial differential equation and 
boundary conditions that price risky bonds with sinking fund provisions. They empirically test 
their model and conclude that their approach is more appropriate than a naive model based on 
the assumption of risk-less debt, especially when valuing low grade bonds issued by companies 
with high debt/equity ratios.   6
Based on the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (1979) binomial model, Ho and Singer (1984) derive a 
closed form solution to pricing a risky coupon bond with a single redemption payment either 
made by open market repurchase of the bond or by calling the bond at par value. In LBO 
transactions debt is usually redeemed according to an agreed schedule and not just once over 
the holding period. Payments are made at discrete points and typically in different amounts. The 
Ho and Singer (1984) model does not reflect the variety of possible amortization schedules, but 
reduces the complexity by assuming just one single redemption payment before maturity. 
However, this model perfectly matches one important typical feature of LBOs, by allowing for a 
bullet payment to payoff the outstanding principal at exit. We adapt this model to LBO 
transactions and, from the observable prices of the debt and equity deployed at transaction 
closing, the holding period, and the values of debt and equity at exit given one single 
amortization payment, we conclude the implied volatility of the target company’s asset value. 
From the asset value volatility we can derive the implied equity risk. 
We describe the Ho and Singer (1984) model and the assumptions necessary to apply it to 
our sample of LBO transactions in the next section. 
3.  The LBO CCA model 
The approach refers to Black and Scholes (1973), who emphasize that common stock of a 
corporation that has outstanding coupon bonds can be considered as a compound option. On 
each coupon date, shareholders have the option of buying the next option by paying the coupon, 
or of forfeiting the firm to the bondholders. Their final option is to repurchase lender claims by 
paying off the principal at maturity. If bond indentures require amortizations the shareholders 
have the additional options of either buying the next option at the redemption date or of forfeiting 
the company. To our knowledge, the literature does not provide a closed form solution for 
valuing risky coupon debt redeemed at discrete points in time (possibly in different amounts) for 
a non-zero principal at maturity. However, the Ho and Singer (1984) model comes close to that   7
                                                
desired feature. The authors provide a closed form solution for a discount bond with one 
amortization payment and a final payoff at maturity. The modifications necessary for transfer of 
this model to typical LBO transactions are as follows:
1
1.  The value of the firm’s assets is independent of its capital structure. 
2.  The firm’s capital structure consists of a single equity and a single debt layer. 
3.  The yield curve is flat and non-stochastic. 
4.  Until the maturity of the debt, the firm’s investment decisions are known. 
5.  The firm does not pay dividends and does not make any other distributions to 
shareholders. 
6.  Default occurs when the firm fails to satisfy the bond indentures. If defaulted, the 
shareholders forfeit the assets to the lenders without any costs. 
7.  The amortization payment is financed with new equity. 
8.  The amortization payment is fixed in the bond indentures as a proportion of the 
debt outstanding at a given time. 
We employ the following notation: 
V(t)  is the value of the firm at t, when the amortization payment is due. 
F  is the value of outstanding debt at the exit date of the LBO transaction. 
sF  is the value of debt to be amortized as a proportion of the value of outstanding debt 
at exit of the LBO. 
T  is the holding period of the LBO transaction. 
τ  is the time from the amortization payment to the exit date, i.e. τ = T – t. 
 
1 Compare to Ho and Singer (1984) p. 317. B[V(t);F,τ] is the value of the debt remaining after the amortization, i.e. the value of a discount 
bond with future value F and time to maturity τ. 
c  is the discount rate of the bond. 
sFe
-cτ  is the amortization payment. 
According to Merton (1974), the value of the company’s equity just after the amortization 
payment can be expressed as the value of a call option on the underlying firm value, with 
exercise price F and time to expiration τ. Default is triggered when the asst value becomes 
smaller than the amortization payment. It is further assumed that trading can take place 
continuously and that the value of the company’s assets follows an Itô diffusion process 
dV / V = α dt + σ dw, where α is the constant instantaneous expected growth of the asset value 
of the firm, σ is the instantaneous standard deviation, and dw is the increment of a standard 
Gauss-Wiener process. The standard deviation of the underlying assets σ is the parameter in 
question, which is finally solved for numerically. Under the above described assumptions Ho and 
Singer (1984) formulate a closed form solution to price a risky discount bond that can be 
transferred for valuing the debt of a target company at closing a LBO transaction. Using our 
notation the solution is as follows: 
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The standard normal density function is f(s). N(z) is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function, and xb is the bankruptcy point at t. The equations are equivalent to the 
Geske (1977) compound option formula for pricing a serial bond. The value of the debt is the 
present value of three claims associated with the debt issue, as follows: the first term is the 
present value of the lender’s claim if the company defaults; the second term is the present value 
of the unredeemed debt if the firm satisfies the amortization payment; and the last term is the 
present value of the redeemed debt if the firm satisfies the amortization requirement. The partial 
derivatives of equation (1) are as follows: 
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The partial derivatives prove the expected influence of V, F, T, c, and r. However, an 
increase in the redemption ratio s increases the expected redemption payments and, hence, 
also increases the debt value. 
For the calculation of σ we implement a Brent-Algorithm.
2 This avoids the calculation of 
derivatives required for the Newton-Raphson method used by other researchers as Brennan and 
Schwartz (1977), Chiras and Manester (1978), Latané and Rendelman (1976), and 
Schmalensee and Trippi (1978). Indeed, the Brent-Algorithm (see appendix) converges more 
slowly but is also more stable. 
4.  The Data Sample and Necessary Simplifications 
From a collection of 122 private placement memoranda (obtained from institutional 
investors) that include 1,001 exited LBO transactions conducted in the USA between 1981 and 
2004, the minimal required information was obtained for only 133 transactions. This includes 
holding period, purchase price at closing, capital structure at closing, and company valuation 
and capital structure at exit. Furthermore, to perfectly qualify for our study, the target companies’ 
capital structures ought to have consisted of a single equity claim and a single debt claim. 
Unfortunately, this was not the case in any of the transactions. As recommended by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), investors usually apply a complex mix of equity and debt claims to minimizing 
agency costs. Furthermore, as underlined by Jensen (1986), the burden of debt should lead to 
more efficient organizations, spur managers to invest in value increasing projects only, and 
increase free cash flows and, hence, company valuations. Consequently, LBOs are usually 
structured with several different layers of debt and equity. The principle of strip financing - as 
comprehensively discussed in Jensen (1989) and Harris and Raviv (1989), and empirically 
investigated by Kaplan and Stein (1993) - plays a major role in structuring transactions. Financial 
 
2 See Brent (1973).   11
sponsors often employ conversion and option rights to secure an alignment of interests between 
different financing parties, managers, and employees of the LBO corporation. There is no limit 
regarding the flexibility of the design of the structured claims. Debt might be convertible to equity 
and equity to debt. Payment-in-kind debt-instruments are often deployed that allow flexible 
redemption. Beside senior debt securities with relatively low interest rates but precisely defined 
amortization schedules, junior and mezzanine strips with higher yields also allow for flexible 
payments. All of these facets are well represented in our data sample, but unfortunately not well 
documented. However, we can not cover this flexibility with our CCA model, and so we explain 
below how we treat complex claims and capital structures in our sample. 
Since the CCA model prohibits additional financing rounds – of either equity or debt – 
many transactions have to be discarded from the sample. Additional financing rounds are not an 
issue  per se that prevent the applicability of our model on current or future transactions. If 
additional financing rounds are planned ex ante by the buyout sponsors they can be considered 
in the initial financing scheme and therefore, also in our model. However, we do not observe 
sufficient information on these additional rounds to correct for them, and hence, discard those 
transactions from the sample. Furthermore, the model does not capture option or conversion 
rights, if structured. To cover additional contingent claims a more complex approach had been 
needed to be derived. However, for most of the above-mentioned 133 sample transactions, no 
detailed information about the design of the particular claims is available, and so it is still 
impossible to test a more sophisticated model. Only a few of the cases provide details of the 
proportions of common and preferred equity or of contractual loan obligations. In these cases we 
were finally able to make a decision about the fit to the proposed CCA method. Consequently, 
transactions that violate the necessary model requirements regarding the deployed capital 
structure and/or additional financing rounds are discarded from the sample if the transaction was 
explicitly structured with convertible debt or other capital layers providing contingent claims 
valuing more than 5% of the company’s total asset value at closing, and if a company’s equity was structured as preferred and common and if there was a dividend guarantee or similar for 
more than 10% of the equity stakes. For all the transactions we assume that no dividends were 
paid and that different equity layers can be regarded as equal. For all these other transactions, 
we also assume that the different debt layers - even if there is a seniority ranking among them - 
can be represented by just one term loan, under the contractual obligation for redemption to a 
certain level at the halfway point to maturity. Time to maturity is the holding period of the LBO 
sponsors. Furthermore, as the proposed CCA model does not allow additional external 
financing, all transactions in which the final debt levels exceed the compounded initial debt 
levels are discarded, i.e. in which 
  . 
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This leaves just 40 LBO transactions in our sample that qualify for the proposed method 
for quantifying implied transaction risks. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our 
sample. 
-------------------------- 
Insert table 1 here 
-------------------------- 
The first and last transactions were closed, respectively, in April 1987 and March 2003. 
The mean closing date is October 1996, while the median is June 1997. The exit dates range 
between November 1993 and December 2003, with a mean of February 2000 and a median of 
June 1999. The holding periods of the transactions range between 3 months and 9 years and 11 
months. The mean holding period is 3 years and 4 months, while the median is 2 years and 5 
months. This indicates that most transactions in our sample have a rather short holding period. 
The enterprise values of the target companies range between $3.6 m and $1,679.7 m, with a 
mean of $181.7  m and a median of $95.9  m. At the exit date, asset values range between 
$10.5 m and $1,347.5 m, with a mean of $227.5 m and a median of $131.5 m. Regarding the 
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leverage ratios for our transactions - at closing between 0.3 and 8.0, with a mean of 2.8 and a 
median of 2.5 - we observe that many of the LBOs are, in fact, very highly leveraged. However, 
the decrease in the leverage ratio over the holding period - to a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 
3.1, with a mean of 0.7 and a median of 0.4 - reveals that debt redemption is an important 
feature of LBO transactions. Referring to the short holding periods, the high deleverage speed is 
of note. Transactions sponsors invested between $0.4 m and $248.4 m, and mean and median 
exposures, respectively, were $47.8  m and $25.0  m. The sponsors benefited from their 
exposure by receiving payoffs between $8.0 m and $631.2 m, with a mean of $140.8 m and a 
median of $95.2 m. They thus obtained internal rates of return on their cash flows of a minimum 
of -39.6%  p.a. and a maximum of 267.5%  p.a. with a mean of 77.6%  p.a. and a median of 
57.9% p.a. The large standard deviations reflect the large fluctuations in the parameters in the 
sample and, hence, reveal the diversity of the transactions. 
This sample is not a random draw from the population of US LBO transactions for several 
reasons. Firstly, our data is gathered from private placement memoranda, which are typically 
edited by buyout firms for the purpose of developing a marketing instrument for generating a 
new fund. Since only successful players will be able to raise another fund, the sample is biased 
to more successful transactions. Secondly, we do not have private placement memoranda of all 
US buyout firms undergoing a fundraising process and we are not able to determine any 
parameter that influences the availability of a memorandum. Thirdly, inclusion in the sample 
depends on the information available on the transaction, which is arbitrarily edited in each 
private placement memorandum and for each transaction. Finally, inclusion in the sample further 
depends on our own selection process described above. 
The mean internal rate of return yielded by the invested equity also reveals that the 
sample is biased towards successful transactions. However, it is not the purpose of this paper to 
benchmark one asset class against others, but to propose a method for calculating risk-adjusted 
returns. Hence, sample bias is not an important issue in terms of the results of this study. 5.  Analysis and Results 
To apply the proposed model to our sample we need to specify further parameters 
including the debt interest rate, the amortization schedule (timing and amounts to be redeemed), 
and debt maturity. Unfortunately, the required information is not available in the documentation 
for our sample LBOs. However, the risk free interest rate can be calculated as the geometric 
mean of the one-year US Treasury rates for the periods corresponding to the individual LBO 
holding periods. Regarding the debt interest rate, we simplify and use two different approaches; 
in the first, we define debt yield to maturity as 8.0% p.a. for all transactions, and in the second 
(part of the sensitivity analysis), we apply a constant credit spread of 3% p.a. on the risk-free 
rate for each transaction. Both approaches disregard different degrees of credit risk for the 
individual transactions and changing yield curves over the time. However, since it is not the 
purpose of this paper to precisely calculate the idiosyncratic risks of the historic transactions, but 
rather to propose an approach for benchmarking current and future ones (in which appropriate 
interest rates can be considered), our simplification seems acceptable. 
Furthermore, detailed information on debt amortization schedules is usually also not 
available. However, since the Ho and Singer (1984) model requires a single amortization 
payment, we assume that this payment is made in the middle of the holding period of the 
individual transactions. The amount of the payment is then given by sFe
-ct, while 





when the amortization payment is made in the middle of the holding period with t=τ. 
Finally, we assume debt maturity to be equal to the holding period of the transaction. This 
corresponds with the view that the observed LBO transactions in our sample exactly match the 
scenario expected by the sponsors. Although this is an unlikely situation, it enables us to prove 
that our concept is transferable to current and future transactions. Transfer is possible because, 
  14for current and future LBOs, the sponsors create a transaction model and all the necessary data 
can be taken as computed from that model. Since the prices of all equity and debt claims are 
determined by the forecast model, it is evident that these prices reflect the expected holding 
period, expected amortizations, debt yield, outstanding debt at the end of the holding period, 
and, consequently, the implied transaction and equity risk according to the CCA approach. 
Using the numerical Brent algorithm (Brent 1973), and the data and definitions given 
above, we calculate the implied idiosyncratic risks for our sample of LBO transactions. The 
parameters and results for all 40 transactions are described in table 2. 
-------------------------- 
Insert table 2 here 
-------------------------- 
The lowest implied volatility of the company asset values is 16.7% p.a. while the highest 
variation is 103.2%  p.a. The mean of the implied company valuation fluctuations for all 40 
transactions is 37.8%, the median is 33.4%, and the standard deviation is 19.0%. 
To benchmark the returns yielded by the individual transactions we derive the volatility of 
the invested equity from the asset value fluctuations. Black and Scholes (1973) provide a 
solution by applying Itô’s Lemma to the calculation of the implied equity volatility from the asset 





EV E σ σ = , (5) 
where: 
σ  is the implied volatility of the company value. 
σE  is the implied equity volatility. 
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V  is the company value at closing. 
E  is the equity value at closing. 
EV  is the partial derivate of the equity value with respect to the company value. 
The implied equity volatilities of the individual transactions are listed in column eight of 
table 2. The implied equity risks are quite large, ranging from 63.1% p.a. to 168.5% p.a. with a 
mean of 98.7% p.a. a median of 101.5% p.a. and a standard deviation of 22.7% p.a. Using the 
internal rates of return reported by the equity sponsors, it is now possible to calculate the Sharpe 
ratios (Sharpe 1966) for the individual transactions. The Sharpe ratios listed in the right hand 
column in table 2, range from -0.34 to 2.53, with a mean average of 0.72, a median of 0.59, and 
a large standard deviation of 0.66. The ratios could be used to benchmark the transactions with 
foregone investments for the same holding period and allowed performance analysis of 
individual transactions possible for the first time. However, since we have neither a sufficiently 
large or unbiased sample of LBO transactions we should not comprehensively compare our 
results e.g. with those of the above-mentioned literature. We merely highlight the magnitude of 
the implied equity volatility, which labels our sample transactions as very risky - on average 
riskier than the 86% p.a. volatility reported by Cochrane (2005). 
Given the calculations of the implied volatilities and the Sharpe ratios for the LBO 
transactions, it is now relevant to analyse the sensitivity of the input parameters used in our 
approach. An increase in the asset value V, leaving all other parameters equal, should also lead 
to an increase in σ. The reason is that an increase in V would simultaneously raise the value of 
debt D. But, since the value of debt must remain the same, volatility has to increase to offset this 
effect. Similarly, if the value of D becomes larger, but V stays constant, volatility must decrease. 
A longer time to maturity lowers the value of debt and, in compensation, volatility should 
decrease. Similarly, if amortizations are paid later and t increases, the value of debt diminishes; 
this again must be balanced by a shrinking σ. Consequently, a potential decrease in the value of   17
debt implied by a higher interest rates r or a larger coupon c will also be compensated for by 
lower volatility. 
To confirm our expectations, we calculate variations in the implied asset value fluctuation 
brought by 1% changes ceteris paribus (respectively, percentage point changes) in the 
underlying variables. We also perform an analogous calculation; rather than fix the coupon at 
8% for all transactions, we apply a constant 3% credit spread to the risk-free interest rate for all 
transactions. Results are described in table 3; as can be expected, we confirm the rationale of 
the model. 
-------------------------- 
Insert table 3 here 
-------------------------- 
Table 3 describes the percentage changes in asset value fluctuations determined by 1% 
increases ceteris paribus in the asset value (V), the value of debt (D), or the holding period (T). It 
also describes the changes if we delay ceteris paribus (t) the redemption payment to 51% of the 
holding period, and if we increase ceteris paribus the risk-free interest rate (r) or the debt coupon 
(c) by 1% point. The last column shows the new asset value volatility for the assumption that the 
debt coupon is not 8% p.a. in every transaction, but determined by a constant credit spread of 
3%  p.a. on the risk-free interest rate. The final rows show the most important descriptive 
statistics of the resulting asset volatility changes. 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
LBOs play an increasingly important role as a financing alternative in corporate lifecycles 
and as an asset class for institutional investors. However, literature does not come to a 
conclusion on a common way to benchmark these transactions from an investor’s point of view. 
Risk measures so far derived by Peng (2001), Quigley and Woodward (2003), Ljungqvist and   18
Richardson (2003), Cochrane (2005), and Groh and Gottschalg (2007) differ greatly in terms of 
scales, and either focus on systematic risk factors, or on value fluctuations of aggregated 
portfolios of LBO transactions, and fail to take into account individual degrees of leverage. We 
use the CCA model (Ho and Singer 1984) to calculate implied idiosyncratic risks in LBO 
transactions. This model is very suitable for the valuation of debt in LBO transactions because it 
considers amortization. The asset value volatility and the equity value volatility can be derived 
from the model via a numerical procedure. For a sample of 40 LBO transactions we determine 
the necessary model parameters and calculate the implied asset and equity volatilities. We verify 
anticipated sensitivities in the model by varying the parameters. Having data on the returns to 
the equity investors of the transactions, we are able to calculate Sharpe Ratios for individual 
transactions for the first time, fully incorporating the superimposed leverage risks. 
The underlying model can be criticized on a number of fronts. Despite the usual 
restrictions on this kind of CCA model, such as continuous trading, or flat and non-stochastic 
yield curves, the most important constraints in the proposed method are the assumptions of 
single layers of debt and equity without further option or conversion rights. Furthermore, a closed 
form solution such as that by Ho and Singer (1984) is only available under the simplified 
assumption of one single amortization payment. 
However, we demonstrate that, with acceptable simplifications, the model can be applied 
to, and is suitable for measuring, the particular risks of LBO transactions. Due to a lack of 
available data, we are unable to perform comprehensive empirical research on risk-adjusted 
returns of the asset class with our proposed method. Nonetheless, our method can be used for 
benchmarking current and future transactions once more and accurate data for the calculation of 
necessary model parameters becomes available.   19
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Data 
 Min  Max  Average  Median  Stdandard-
deviation. 
Closing Date  Apr 87  Mar 03  Oct 96  Jun 97  45.2 months 
Exit Date  Nov 93  Dec 03  Feb 00  Jun 99  38.1 months 
Holding Period [years]  0.25 9.92 3.32 2.42  2.32 
Enterprise Value at Closing [$m]  3.6 1,679.7  181.7  95.9  290.9 
Enterprise Value at Exit [$m]  10.5 1,347.5  227.5  131.5  263.9 
Initial Debt/Equity  0.3 8.0 2.8 2.5  1.9 
Exit Debt/Equity  0 3.1 0.7 0.4  0.7 
Equity Investment [$m]  0.4 248.4  47.8  25.0  56.0 
Equity Payoff [$m]  8.0 631.2 140.8  95.2  139.6 
IRR (p.a.)  -39.6% 267.5%  77.6%  57.9%  71.8% 
 
Table 1 describes the most important parameters of our sample transactions. 
 















































































































































































































































1 5.50  5.16%  21.3  15.3  0.0  24.70% 69.66% 75.3%  1.01 
2 6.33  4.96%  95.0  72.1  57.8  26.01% 75.38%  188.0%  2.43 
3 0.25  5.15%  58.5  44.0  42.6  44.05% 168.46% -22.6%  -0.16 
4 1.33  5.08%  67.0  48.0  30.8  37.48% 115.48%  193.2%  1.63 
5 2.00  4.37%  364.6  260.7  185.8 36.87% 106.75%  104.8%  0.94 
6 3.92  5.55%  35.5  19.7  17.7  38.87% 77.17% 56.0%  0.65 
7 7.50  5.65%  312.4  272.4  262.0 16.70% 73.91% 33.7%  0.38 
8 5.58  4.01%  315.0  243.0  170.6 28.36% 83.33% 23.7%  0.24 
9 1.00  5.52%  17.0  11.0  11.0  39.84% 104.35%  130.9%  1.20   20
10 4.17 5.36%  117.5  87.5  77.9  27.23% 81.47% 49.8%  0.55 
11 5.08 4.83%  10.0  5.7  2.4  38.39% 76.29% 29.0%  0.32 
12 3.58 5.00%  6.4  3.1  1.3  47.63% 84.12% 55.0%  0.59 
13 9.92 4.95%  45.0  35.4  20.6  22.16% 65.83% 23.5%  0.28 
14 2.50 2.44%  211.0  107.6  30.0  57.61% 104.82% 25.0%  0.22 
15 3.92 4.62%  16.9  11.9  7.1  32.36% 85.94% 55.7%  0.59 
16 4.83 4.42%  3.6  3.2  2.5  19.28% 93.67% 80.4%  0.81 
17 2.17 4.50%  164.4  139.4  30.4  21.45% 104.74%  205.5%  1.92 
18 1.17 5.25%  116.5  83.0  75.3  36.66% 112.85%  135.8%  1.16 
19 2.08 5.33%  38.0  30.5  19.7  25.66% 102.85%  266.0%  2.53 
20 1.42 1.78%  132.0  74.7  14.3  59.80% 123.94% 67.3%  0.53 
21 0.75 1.24%  74.9  25.9  20.6  103.23% 152.27% 166.4%  1.08 
22 4.67 3.74%  51.3  25.2  0.0  45.50% 79.60% 21.0%  0.22 
23 6.58 6.46%  234.0  167.0  150.5  22.61% 63.11%  1.8%  -0.07 
24 1.92 2.78%  88.0  17.8  0.0  100.77% 123.85% -39.6%  -0.34 
25 2.33 4.67%  56.0  41.4  0.0  28.56% 92.42%  144.2%  1.51 
26 1.75 5.58%  125.5  85.2  57.4  36.82% 101.40% 68.0%  0.62 
27 2.50 2.44%  350.0  188.5  154.2  55.27% 103.93% 30.0%  0.27 
28 9.17 5.00%  323.0  248.0  133.9  23.12% 66.30% 14.2%  0.14 
29 5.25 4.31%  30.0  20.7  13.4  32.93% 80.66% 40.7%  0.45 
30 4.00 4.16%  63.7  44.9  41.5  33.84% 87.26% 27.9%  0.27 
31 1.33 5.57% 1,679.7 1,431.3 818.0  21.82% 118.64% 79.2%  0.62 
32 4.50 3.83%  40.9  24.6  21.0  41.38% 84.54% 11.4%  0.09 
33 1.33 5.51%  75.0  54.4  54.2  31.91% 102.08% 45.3%  0.39 
34 1.08 5.17%  417.3  243.6  209.6  50.57% 113.22% 77.3%  0.64 
35 2.75 5.44%  96.8  81.8  59.5  20.96% 97.48% 59.8%  0.56 
36 2.00 2.74%  103.0  51.2  23.7  62.53% 112.52% 26.0%  0.21 
37 1.25 5.47%  172.2  152.0  138.9  19.90% 128.04%  267.5%  2.05 
38 1.67 5.41%  857.3  677.0  370.0  27.20% 107.18%  108.1%  0.96 
39 1.58 5.44%  100.0  75.0  64.7  31.36% 106.45% 75.3%  0.66 
40 2.08 2.68%  182.1  133.4  76.8  39.39% 114.86%  103.4%  0.88 
                
        Minimum 16.70% 63.11%  -39.6%  -0.34 
        Mean 37.77% 98.67% 77.6%  0.72 
        Median 33.39% 101.74% 57.9%  0.59 
        Maximum 103.23% 168.46% 267.5%  2.53 
       Standard  Deviation 18.97% 22.72% 71.8%  0.66 
 
The six columns on the left of table 2 list the model parameters necessary to calculate the 
implied transaction risks and the implied equity risks for our 40 sample transactions. Columns 
seven and eight depict the resulting risks. Column nine shows the internal rates of return 
reported by the transaction equity sponsors, while column ten shows the Sharpe Ratios. The 
final rows of the table show the most important descriptive statistics for our results.   21
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis 
Transaction  #  V  D T t r c  3%  Credit 
Spread 
1  0.43% -0.44% -0.52% -0.08% -3.30% -3.26%  24.21% 
2  0.46% -0.48% -0.38% -0.19% -3.68% -1.05%  26.05% 
3  1.01% -0.28% -0.40% -0.42% -3.69% -0.13%  44.03% 
4  0.72% -0.74% -0.44% -0.31% -3.95% -0.95%  37.40% 
5  0.62% -0.63% -0.38% -0.31% -3.39% -0.76%  37.35% 
6  0.36% -0.31% -0.51% -0.33% -4.92% -0.99%  38.33% 
7  0.54% -0.58% -0.34% -0.13% -3.70% -0.79%  16.18% 
8  0.51% -0.55% -0.34% -0.20% -3.12% -0.98%  29.33% 
9  0.56% -0.19% -0.44% -0.37% -4.53% -0.26%  39.70% 
10  0.47% -0.47% -0.39% -0.23% -3.95% -0.76%  26.95% 
11  0.39% -0.42% -0.54% -0.25% -4.15% -2.13%  38.73% 
12  0.40% -0.42% -0.62% -0.34% -4.69% -2.25%  47.63% 
13  0.43% -0.46% -0.41% -0.12% -3.49% -1.73%  22.24% 
14  0.51% -0.54% -0.50% -0.37% -3.13% -1.86%  61.97% 
15  0.50% -0.54% -0.41% -0.24% -3.61% -1.25%  32.83% 
16  0.71% -0.76% -0.26% -0.15% -2.79% -0.59%  19.64% 
17  0.76% -0.78% -0.33% -0.11% -2.43% -1.60%  22.20% 
18  0.63% -0.47% -0.39% -0.34% -3.85% -0.40%  36.56% 
19  0.70% -0.73% -0.37% -0.20% -3.61% -0.91%  25.36% 
20  0.67% -0.70% -0.49% -0.36% -2.74% -1.89%  65.23% 
21  0.56% -0.24% -0.60% -0.92% -3.37% -0.55%  105.27% 
22  0.38% -0.38% -0.59% -0.19% -3.32% -3.30%  49.14% 
23  0.37% -0.39% -0.54% -0.18% -6.13% -1.45%  20.47% 
24  0.42% -0.42% -0.90% -0.61% -4.02% -3.97%  108.20% 
25  0.60% -0.60% -0.47% -0.11% -2.85% -2.84%  29.40% 
26  0.60% -0.61% -0.49% -0.31% -4.65% -1.07%  36.20% 
27  0.46% -0.38% -0.40% -0.47% -3.02% -0.66%  56.98% 
28  0.42% -0.45% -0.42% -0.12% -3.57% -1.82%  23.12% 
29  0.45% -0.48% -0.40% -0.23% -3.50% -1.23%  33.76% 
30  0.47% -0.44% -0.34% -0.28% -3.25% -0.63%  34.38% 
31  0.86% -0.90% -0.35% -0.17% -3.30% -0.93%  21.29% 
32  0.40% -0.38% -0.40% -0.33% -3.41% -0.85%  42.39% 
33  0.57% -0.33% -0.37% -0.30% -3.96% -0.30%  31.76% 
34  0.56% -0.36% -0.50% -0.46% -4.54% -0.56%  50.48% 
35  0.69% -0.73% -0.33% -0.17% -3.46% -0.74%  20.64% 
36  0.53% -0.55% -0.50% -0.47% -3.35% -1.38%  65.47% 
37  0.87% -0.87% -0.26% -0.18% -2.96% -0.24%  19.78% 
38  0.73% -0.76% -0.40% -0.21% -3.68% -1.16%  26.73% 
39  0.63% -0.57% -0.38% -0.28% -3.89% -0.50%  31.14% 
40  0.70% -0.74% -0.33% -0.30% -2.70% -0.84%  41.29% 
          
Minimum  0.36% -0.90% -0.90% -0.92% -6.13% -3.97%  16.18% 
Mean  0.57% -0.53% -0.44% -0.28% -3.64% -1.24%  38.50% 
Median  0.55% -0.48% -0.40% -0.27% -3.53% -0.96%  34.07% 
Maximum  1.01% -0.19% -0.26% -0.08% -2.43% -0.13%  108.20% 
Standard Deviation  0.15% 0.17% 0.12% 0.16% 0.70% 0.89%  20.32%   22
 
Table 3 describes the percentage changes in asset value fluctuations determined by 1% 
increases ceteris paribus in the asset value (V), the value of Debt at closing (D), or the holding 
period (T). It also describes the changes if we postpone, ceteris paribus, the redemption 
payment to 51% (t is increased) of the holding period, and if we increase, ceteris paribus, the 
risk-free interest rate (r), or the debt coupon (c) by 1% point. The last column shows the new 
asset value volatility for the assumption that the debt coupon is not 8% p.a. in every transaction, 
but determined by a constant credit spread of 3% points on the risk-free rate. The final rows 
show the most important descriptive statistics of the resulting asset value volatility changes. Appendix 
Brent’s algorithm (Brent 1973) is an efficient way to numerically solve for the root of an 
equation without calculating the derivative. It basically applies quadratic interpolation based on 
three points, but switches to bisection if this interpolation does not lead to an improvement. 
Let f denote the target function. In our case f is the value of debt given in equation (1) 
minus the target debt value to be matched. The algorithm requires two starting points σ0, σ1 such 
that f(σ0) and f(σ1) have different signs. It is σ2 = σ1 defined. 
A new value σ* is calculated as follows: 
If f(σ0) <> f(σ2) and f(σ1) <> f(σ2), then 
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With this new value the three node points are updated: 
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σ2 = σ1
If f(σ0) · f(σ*) < 0 then 
σ1 = σ*, 
otherwise 
σ0 = σ*. 
If | f(σ0) | < | f(σ1) | then σ0 and σ1 are switched. 
The algorithm stops if | σ0 – σ0 | is smaller than a predefined accuracy, in our case 0.01%.   25
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